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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the behavior of a single firm engaged in R 
and D for a ''sponsor,'' We are interested in two particular aspects 
of the interaction between the two agents: (1) the revelation to the 
sponsor of new information generated by the firm's research, and (2)
the firm's choice of research strategy. We show that contractual 
forms which provide good incentives in a static environment may 
introduce incentive problems in a dynamic setting, More speoif ioally, 
we show that a firm engaged in a sequence of R and D contracts is more 
likely to do research (1) the lower are the costs of R and D, (2) the 
better is the state of sponsor knowledge, and (3) the longer is the 
sequence of contracts (given an appropriately high discount factor), 
We also show that the firm reveals a larger share of its results (1) 
the better is the state of sponsor knowledge, (2) the better is the 
state of private knowledge possessed by the firm, and (3) the shorter 
is the sequence of contracts, Finally, somewhat surprisingly, we find 
that the amount of information a firm reveals is independent of the 
costs of R and D. 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESEARCH CONTRACTING 
1, INTRODUCTION 
Joel Balbien 
and 
Louis L. Wilde 
California Institute of Technology 
A considerable body of economic theory has been developed over 
the last fifteen years to model (i) R and D decisionmaking by private 
firms, (ii) general equilibrium aspects of industrial innovation, and 
(iii) principal-agent relations. Of particular interest to those 
concerned with public policy are papers by Scherer [1969), Bernholdt 
[19671 and Cummins [1973), who have analyzed the behavior of defense 
contractors as reflected in cost over-runs or under-runs. These 
authors consider the rational choice of risk-assumption provisions in 
the uncertain environment typically characterizing a bilateral 
procurement contract, Related papers are by Williamson [1967), who 
has attempted to ascertain what factors are responsible for 
performance results obtained in military contracts, and Agapos and 
Dunlop [1970), who have developed a price-determination model for 
bilateral procurement, In spite of this work, our understanding of 
the behavior of firms engaged in sponsored research is very limited. 
In this paper we are particularly interested in two aspects of the 
interaction between private firms and a research sponsor (who may or 
may not be a government bureaucrat): (1) the revelation to the 
sponsor of technical change embodied in the firm's physical and human 
capital and (2) the firm's choice of research strategy. 
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In the next section of this paper we introduce a discrete-time 
dynamic programming model which captures the essence, we believe, of 
the problem from the firm's perspective, It turns out that the form 
of the payoff function is especially important in our model. Section 
' 
3 analyzes the model for the most ''natural'' form of the payoff 
function, We show there that a firm engaged in a sequence of R and D 
contracts is more likely to do research (1) the lower are the costs of 
R and D, (2) the better is the state of public (or sponsor) knowledge, 
and (3) the longer is the sequence of contracts (given an 
appropriately high discount factor), We also show that the firm 
reveals a larger share of its results (1) the better is the state of 
public (or sponsor) knowledge, (2) the better is the state of 
(private) knowledge possessed by the firm, and (3) the shorter is the 
sequence of contracts. We also show, somewhat surprisingly, that the 
amount of information a firm reveals is independent of the costs of R 
and D. 
Section 4 discusses alternate forms of the payoff function as 
well 'as a number of .extensions of the basic model. A final section 
offers some concluding remarks, 
We want to emphasize that the purpose of this exercise is not 
to characterize ''optimal'' incentive contracts. Indeed, we never 
even go so far as to specify an objective function for the research 
sponsor. Rather, we are interested in examining the performance of 
contract forms which currently exist, or are likely to emerge in the 
future (especially in response to increased levels of government 
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sponsored R and D), One reason we take this approach is that the 
conditions which characterize optimal incentive contracts may often 
not be operational. For example, if the sponsor is only interested in 
getting the firm to reveal the results of its research, then 
introducing nonconvexity into the payoff function will suffice, But 
this isn't an operational solution since the sponsor is unlikely to 
know how much nonconvexity is ''enough,'' Furthermore, other 
informational and/or institu�ional constraints often limit the set of 
feasible instruments, 
2 • TIIE MODEL; PRFLIMINARIES 
The focus of this paper is on the interaction between a 
research sponsor and a particular firm, In this section a stylized 
model is developed which makes several strong assumptions about the 
nature of the research process and the rQWard to the firm. While we 
only analyze one version of the model in detail, the purpose of the 
exercise is in part to develop a methodology which can be modified in 
a variety of ways to address different problems. 
Suppose that a research sponsor is interested in reducing the 
cost of some technology, It contracts with a firm to undertake 
research designed to accomplish this goal. We make two crucial 
assumptions regarding the nature of contract incentives, First, we 
assume that the reward earned by the firm in each period is a function 
of the current state of sponsor knowledge -- a level of unit costs 
R -- and the new state of sponsor knowledge created by the firm's 
reported research -- a level of unit costs r, We of course require 
that r not exceed R since knowledge of the technology required to 
produce at unit cost R is presumed to be known to the sponsor, We 
denote the payoff function by W(r,R),1 
If the research sponsor could costlessly monitor the firm, 
then the firm would always report fully its research output; that is, 
in each period it would reveal to the research sponsor the true 
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minimum cost yielded by its research. But monitoring is not costless, 
and the firm may wish to sign a new contract with the research sponsor 
when the current contract expires. Hence it has an incentive to 
withhold information temporarily. We assume that the firm never lies 
(in other words, it must document each contract's final report) but it 
need not reveal everything it knows,2 If a is the true minimum unit 
cost which the firm ''holds in inventory'' then its reported unit 
costs cannot be lower than a; i,e, we require that ai r i R, In the 
analysis which follows, we are particularly interested in the 
relationship between the form of the payoff function W(r,R) and the 
firm's incentives to reveal its research output. 
To finish specifying the firm's problem we need only to 
describe the research process, In this paper we use a very simple 
search-theoretic approach, Assume that the length of a contract is 
fixed at one period. In each period the firm can either engage in 
research or not. The cost of research is fixed at c, c l  0, The 
output of research is uncertain, though. We assume that by paying c 
the firm gets a random draw from a distribution of potential unit 
costs, F, For analytical convenience, we assume that F is 
differentiable with f(x) = F'(x) strictly positive on some interval 
[a,b ] ,3 
The firm's objective is to maximize its discounted expected 
profit from engaging in a series of contracts with the sponsor, Thus 
the problem can be formalized using simple discrete-time dynamic 
programming techniques. 
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Let Vt(a,R) be the discounted expected profit when there are t
periods remaining in the planning horizon given that the state of 
sponsor knowledge is a level of unit costs R and the state of the 
firm's private knowledge is a level of unit costs a, In this model t 
can be thought of as the maximum remaining number of contracts in 
which the firm expects to participate. By the Principle of 
Optimality, 
Vt(a,R) = max 
{ -c+E max [W(r,R)+PVt-1(min{a,X},r)]Rlrlmin{a,X} 
max [W(r,R)+PVt-1<a,r)] Rlrla 
The first term on the right-hand-side of (1) represents discounted 
expected profit when the firm conducts research (X is the random 
variable associated with research output), The second term on the 
(1) 
right-hand-side of (1) represents discounted expected prof it when no 
research is conducted (even here some ''new'' information might still 
be revealed by the firm if R is strictly greater than a). In either 
case, the relevant discount rate is p, 0 < P < 1,4 
Equation (1) holds for all t l 1, For t = O, define 
Vo(a,R) = O for all a and R, If R > a there might be some prof it to 
the firm from selling its residual information stock to other private 
parties, but we assume penalties for such action are so severe as to 
eliminate the possibility,5 
This model is very simple, yet it is surprisingly rich. The 
only technical assumptions needed in addition to those already 
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introduced concern the payoff function W(r,R). It is quite natural to 
assume that the payoff to the firm increases as the difference between 
the level of unit costs previously known by the sponsor and the level 
of unit costs reported by the firm increases. To this end we assume 
Wr(r,R) < 0 and WR(r,R) > O for all r i R, 6 We further assume that
Wrr<r,R) < 0 WRR(r,R) < 0 for all r i R. The latter simply reflect
diminishing returns. 
Many of the results derived below depend on the sign of 
WrR(r,R), We initially analyze the model under the assumption that
Wra(r,R) > 0 for all r i R, This is perhaps the most ·realistic case.
It implies that a decrease in the level of unit costs previously known 
to the sponsor increases the marginal return to further reductions in 
it, As Figure 1 illustrates, this is equivalent to saying that as the 
level of sponsor-known unit costs decreases, the payo�f to reporting 
low levels of unit costs remains relatively high. Thus, in this case, 
the research sponsor is interested in achieving a low level of unit 
costs, not just in being able to attain a ''breakthrough, '' An 
example of such a payoff function is W(r,R) = U(R-r) where U' > 0 and 
U'' < 0, 
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[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Section 3 of this paper will analyze the model under the 
assumption that WrR > o. Section 4 will consider how the results are
effected by assuming either WrR = o or WrR < o. It will also discuss
a number of other extensions of the basic model, 
To ease notation throughout the remainder of the paper, let 
gt(r,a,R) W(r,R) + PVt-1(a,r)
and 
Then (1) becomes 
3, 'IBE MODEL: WrR > O
max gt(r,a,R),R2.r2.a 
max{-c+F.Gt(min{a,X},R),Gt(a,R)}, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
To characterize the optimal policy implicit in the solution to 
the functional equation (1), we start with the single-period problem 
and then use induction to generalize'the results to t 2. 1, 
Given Wr < O and Vo = O, it will always pay the firm to report
everything it knows at the end of the project horizon. Hence 
61(a,R) = gi(a,a,R) = W(a,R), and 
EG1 ( min{a ,X} ,R) Eg1(min{a,X}, min{a,X},R) 
EW(min{a,X} ,R) 
= r W(x,R)f(x)dx + l W(a,R)f(x)dx, (5) 
Given (5), the first question we ask of the finn's optimal 
policy is whether or not it engages in research, Research is 
preferred to no research if -c + EG1(min{a,X},R) ) Gi(a,R), Thus we
seek to characterize, in some useful way, the set of all (a,R) such 
that -c + EG1(min{a,X},R) ) G1(a,R), Using (5) and the fact that
61(a,R) = W(a,R) we have 
-c + EG1(min{a,X},R) ) G1(a,R)
if and only if 
-c + r W(x,R)f(x)dx + l W(a,R)f(x)dx > W(a,R)
which, in turn, holds if and only if 
c < r [W(x,R) - W(a,R)] f(x)dx = Hl(a,R), (6) 
Using Hl(a,R) as defined in (6) we define a ''reservation 
level of privately known unit costs,'' ai(R), by Hl(ai,R) = c, The 
following property of Hl guarantees ai is unique: 
H�(a,R) = -Wr(a,R)F(a) ) 0, 
Furthermore, 
{(a,R)l-c + EG1(min{a,x},R) ) G1(a,R)} = {(a,R)la) ai<c,R)},
( 7) 
so that a� is indeed a ''reservation'' quantity, Figure 2 illustrates 
a• 71' 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
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It is obvious from inspection of Figure 2 that dai/dc ) 0, 
The formal proof of this result is given in Appendix 1, It is also 
shown there that dai/dR ) O. Hence we have the following 
proposition,8 
Proposition 1: (a) dai/dc ) O, 
(b) WrR ) O implies dai/dR ) 0, 
The lower is ai, the more likely is the finn to engage in 
research. Thus, Proposition 1 shows that either lowering the cost of 
research or lowering the level of sponsor-known unit costs is likely 
to encourage research. The latter result depends crucially on the 
assumption that WrR L o .  It is easy to show, for example, that
WrR < 0 implies dai/dR < O.
Establishing results for t l 2 requires knowledge of the 
properties of V1(a,R). Using ai we can write V1(a,R) in a form which
makes analysis of it much easier. That is, 
a a 
if a > • ai 
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�-o + Jlv<x,R)f(x)dx + t W(a,R)f(x)dx
V1(a,R) = a• 9 (8) (Wa,R) if a i 1 
The following lemmas follow directly upon differentiating expression 
(8), The proofs are therefore omitted. 
Lemma 1: (a) dV1(a,R)/dR > O, 
(b) d2V1(a,R)/dR
2 < 0, 
Lemma 2: dV1(a,R)/da < O. 
Lemma 3: (a) WrR ) 0 implies d
2V1(a,R)/dRda ) 0,
(b) d2V1(a,R)/dRdc = 0,
We are now ready to consider the two-period problem, This is 
inherently more interesting than the one-period problem since the 
potential to withhold information now exists, Recall from (1) that 
R2.r2Jnin {a ,X} 
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max (9) 
{ -c + E max [W(r,R) + flV1(min{a,X},r)] 
max [W(r,R) + flV1(a,r)] R2.r2.a 
Also, from (2) and (3), we have 
and 
g2(r,a,R) 
62(a,R) = max g2(r,a,R) R2.r2.a 
where aifri�
x g2(r,a,R) = r;<a,R) is the optimal amount of private
information to reveal, Equation (9) can thus be rewritten as in (4): 
V2(a,R) = max{-c + EG2(min(a,X},R), Gz(a,R)}. (10) 
As before, we wish to characterize the set of all (a,R) such that 
-c + EG2(min{a,X},R) > G2(a,R), To begin, consider the properties of
ri(a,R), 
Proposition 2: rz(a,R) is a well-defined maximum.IO Furthermore,
(a) WrR ) 0 implies drzldR > 0,
(b) WrR ) 0 implies drifda ) 0,
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(c) drz/dc = O. 
Proposition 2 suggests that the firm will tend to report a 
lower unit cost the lower is the level of sponsor-known unit costs or 
the lower is the level of unit costs privately known by the firm. 
The remarkable result is that ri(a,R) is independent of c -- the 
optimal amount of private information to reveal is independent of the 
cost of research. In other words, how much of its knowledge a firm 
reveals in any given period is independent of how much it will cost 
to acquire more information later. 
Consider next EG2(min{a,X},R), By definition 
g2(r;<a,R),a,R). Hence
EG2(min{a,x} ,R) r g2(r;(x,R),x,R)f(x)dx + l g2(r;(a,R),a,R)f(x)dx.
Thus 
-c + EG2(min{a,X},R) > G2(a,R) 
if and only if 
-c + r g2(ri(x,R),x,R)f(x)dx + l g2(r2(a,R),a,R)f(x)dx ) g2(ri<a,R),a,R)
which, in turn, holds if and only if 
c < r [g2(r;<x,R),x,R) - g2(r;<a,R),a,R)] f(x)dx = u2(a,R)
Using H2(a,R) as defined in (11) we define a reservation level of 
privately known unit costs for the two-period problem, <1z(R), by 
(11) 
c, Consider the properties of H2(a,R), 
�{a, R) 
But Bg2<ri•a, R)/ar = 0 by the first-order-condition defining ri. 
Furthermore, Bg2{ri•a,R)/8a = paV2(a,r)/8a < 0, Hence
�{a,R) 
Thus 
({a,R)l-c + EG2(min(a,X}, r) > G2(a,R)} = ((a,R)la > ai<c,R)},
We also have the following analogue to Proposition 1, 
Proposition 3: (a) dai/dc > 0,
(b) WrR > O implies dai/dR > 0, 
Proposition 3 shows that ai behaves in a similar fashion as 
ai to changes in c and R, The next result shows that as the project 
horizon increases, the firm may or may not be more likely to do 
research depending on the size of the discount rate, 
Proposition 4: WrR > O implies 
" 
ai{R) i ai(R) if p l P2,
A 
that there exists P2a(O,l) such that 
This is an important result because it highlights the 
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interaction between the firm's incentives to do research and its 
ability to withhold information. Normally we would expect that an 
increase in the project horizon would increase the incentives to do 
research, But in this model an increase in the project horizon 
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causes the firm to reveal less information {at least when WrR > 0) ,11
Hence the benefits of doing research { which can be received only when 
the information is revealed) are postponed into the future while the 
costs of research are paid in the present. If the firm discounts the 
future too much, then an increa·se in the project horizon will reduce 
the incentives to do research in the present, 
Finally, we need to derive the properties of V2(a,R). Not 
surprisingly they turn out to be almost identical to those of 
Y 1(a, R) � almost, but not quite, The only difference is that 
d2V2(a,R)/dR
2 cannot be signed under the assumptions made so far,
Unfortunately, this turns out to be crucial to the induction 
argument, However, for a wide class of payoff functions, 
d2V2(a,R)/dR
2 will be negative so an assumption that v2 is concave
will not be overly strong, 
Lemma 4: dV2(a, R)/dR > o,
Lemma S: dV2(a, R)/da > o. 
Lemma 6: (a) 
{b) 
WRr > 0 implies d2V2(a,R)/dRda > O,
d2V2(a, R)/dRdc = O.
As pointed out above, Lemma 4 is not as strong as we would 
like, It is necessary for the induction argument which generalizes 
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the above results to all t l 1 that d2Vt(a,R)/dR
2 < 0, Since for the
most general class of payoff functions meeting our assumptions 
d2Vt(a,R)/dR
2 is of ambiguous sign, we will simply assume that it is
negative and state our results under that condition, However, it 
should be noted that when W(r,R) = U(R - r) where U' ) 0 and U'' 0, 
our prototypic payoff function for WrR ) o, it can be shown (see
Appendix II) that d2V2(a,R)/dR
2 �negative. Thus, for the class of
payoff functions given by (U(R - r)lu• > 0 and U'' < O} all the 
results of this section generalize to t l l, We summarize them in 
the following Proposition: 
Proposition 5: Suppose WrR(a,R) ) O for all a and R. If
d2Vt(a,R)/dR
2 < 0 for all t l 1, then
(a) There exists a unique value of a, a;, such that 
((a,R)l-c + EGt(min(a,X},R) ) Gt(a,R)} = ((a,R)la) a:(c,R)}, 
Furthermore, 
(i) da;/dc > 0, 
(ii) da;/dR > o , 
" 
(iii) there exists Pte<o,1> such that
a;+l(R) i a;(R) for P l �t•
(b) Define ar� max gt(r,a,R) = r�(a,R).R2.rla 
• Then rt is a well-
defined maximum. Furthermore, 
(i) dr;/dR > O, 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
dr;/da > O, 
dr•/dc = 0, t 
r:+l(a,R) L r:(a,R),
The new result in Proposition 5, that r:+l(a,R) L r;(a,R) for all
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t L 1, is very important. It shows that when wrR > 0, the longer the
sequence of projects the firm envisions as possible, the less 
incentive it has to reveal the results of its research, However, 
this effect is offset to some extent by the fact that when 
" 
. ( . P L Pt, at+l R) i at(R) so that the longer the sequence of projects
the firm envisions as possible, the more incentive it has to do 
research in the first place, 
It is standard at this point to show that as t goes to 
infinity, the sequence of finite horizon value functions (Vt}
converge to a function V which is the unique solution to  the infinite 
horizon analogue to equation (1), Such arguments are straightforward 
for this kind of problem and won't be detailed in this paper, The 
properties of V are analogous to members of (Vt}• Furthermore, the 
sequences ca;} and er;} converge to f�ctions a• and r• which have 
properties analogous to members of ca;} and er;} respectively. 
4, VARIATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
a. There are a number of variations of our basic 
model which are of interest both from a theoretical point of view and 
from a practical point of view, The most obvious concern alternate 
\ 
forms of the payoff function, Consider first the case in which 
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WrR(r,R) = 0 for all r i R. There are two problems with this form of
payoff function, one is technical and the other has to do with the 
realism of the model. 
Consider first the technical problem, If WrR(r, R) 0 for
all r i R, then W can be decomposed into W(r, R) = K + m(r) + n(R)
where K is a constant term and m and n are functions with no constant 
terms, In general we would like to assume that if r = R then the 
firm earns no ''bonus'' over and above the fixed reward K, This, 
however, requires that m(x) = -n(x) for all x L O, in which case
W(r,R) K - n(r) + n(R) 
Hence Wrr -n'' and Waa = n''• But we require Wrr < O and WRR < 0, 
With W(r,R) = K - n(r) + n(R) these cannot both be satisfied,
In spite of the technical problem with the assumption that 
WrR = 0, some might be reluctant to abandon this case because it
includes payoff functions which are linear in r and R, 12 However, it 
is a common observation that many firms, especially those engaged in.
government sponsored R and D, tend to be very risk averse. To see
the implications of risk aversion, let a monetary payoff function be
denoted by n(r,R) and let a utility of money function for the firm be
denoted by U(n), Assume U' ) 0 and U'' < O. Then
W(r, R) = U(n(r,R)), so that
w rr U'llrr + U' 'n�' 
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and 
WRR = U'nRR + U' 'n�·
Now llrr i 0 and 7TRR i 0 imply Wrr < 0 and WRR < 0, respectively, But
even if llrR = O, WrR ) 0, In fact, it might even be that llrR < 0 and
still WrR < O if the firm _is sufficiently risk averse,
b, WrR < O: The second argument presented against the
assumption that WrR = O also applies to some extent to this case.
However, in the above example, _if llrR < o then it might be the case
that WrR < O as well, This would imply that a decrease in the level
of sponsor-known unit costs decreases the marginal return to further 
reductions in it. As Figure 3 illustrates, this is equivalent to 
saying that as the level of sponsor-known unit costs decreases, the 
payoff to reporting low levels of unit costs becomes relatively 
low -- the research sponsor rewards initial ''breakthroughs'' from 
high unit costs disproportionately well. 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
It does this in a strange way though, A more ' 'natural'' way 
to accomplish the same goal would be to let Wrr < o and WRR ) o.
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Nevertheless, one can easily derive results analogous to those 
presented in Section 3 of this paper for the case of WrR(r, R) < O. 
We will simply state the analogue to Proposition S as the techniques 
of proof are the same, 
Proposition 6: Suppose WrR(r, R) < o for all r i R, If
d2Vt(a,R)/dR
2 < 0 then for all t L l:
(a) There exists a unique value of a, a;, such that 
(b) 
{(a, R)l-c + llGt(min{a, R),R) > Gt(a,R)) = {(a, R)la > a;<R)).
Furthermore, 
(i) da;/dc > o , 
(ii) da;/dR < 0, 
(iii) a:+l (R) l a:(R),
Define argmax gt(r, a, R) = r�(a,R),R> r) a 
defined maximum, 
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
dr:/dR < 0, 
dr;/da < 0, 
dr•/dc = t O,
. .'.'. rt+l (a, R) < 
Furthermore 
r:<a, R), 
Then r• t is a well-
On the surface, WrR < O seems to yield desirable behavior on
the part of the firm, The higher are sponsor-known unit costs, the 
more likely the firm is to engage in research and the more likely it 
is to report the results of that research (for any given a), 
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However, as a falls, r;(a, R) rises -- a decrease in privately known 
unit costs increases the optimal level of unit costs to report, Even 
more troublesome effects concern increases in the planning horizon, 
First, a;+l La;; the longer the sequence of projects the firm
envisions as possible, the less likely it is to do research. Second, 
19 
it is quite possible that r;+l < r;; it might be that an increase in
the planning horizon induces the firm to reveal more of its privately 
known information. This possibility suggests that more is going on 
here than meets the eye, 
Suppose r;+1<a, R) < r;(a, R) for some t. Furthermore, suppose
a <  r;+l(a, R) and a <  a;. Now a: i a;+l so that a <  a;+l as well,
Under these circumstances, when t + 1 periods remain in the planning 
horizon then the firm reveals r;+1(a,R) and does no research. In the
next period the state of the f.irm' s private knowledge is still a but 
the state of sponsor knowledge is now r;+1<a,R). But
r;+1<a,R) < r;(a, R) so when t periods remain in the planning horizon,
the firm does nothing, It neither reveals any new information 
(although it could) nor does research, But it is difficult to see 
how this can be a prof it maximizing strategy. In any given period 
the firm should either reveal some new information or do research 
unless r;(a, R) = a and a i ar ; i.e. unless it never intends to do 
more research and has already revealed all of its knowledge, The 
problem here is that the withholding of information might create 
incentives not to do research, just as when WrR > o. But when
WrR < o, r:+l(a,R) < r;(a,R) is possible. It is our conjecture that
when WrR ( O, additional restrictions (such as those imposed when
WrR = 0) will imply that a i a:+l(R) and r�+l(a, R) i r:(a, R) are
incompatible, but we have not yet been able to get formal results 
along these lines, 
c. Targets: The model developed in this paper has much in
common with the recent planning literature, 14 One of the major 
differences is the lack of ''targets'' in the payoff function, An 
example of the latter is a contract in which the firm specifies in 
adyance what its output will be in a future period, It receives no 
reward if the pre-set target is not met. Similarly, it receives no 
''bonus'' if a level of performance higher than the target is 
reported, 15 The methodology used in s�ctions 2 and 3 of this paper 
can easily be extended to deal with such a case. The relevant 
functional equation is: 
for a > S, 
{-c+ [W(S,R)+pE max Vt-1(X,S,r)]F(S)S2.r2.0 
Vt(a,R,S) = max o 
and for (J i S, 
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{W(S,R)-c+jlE max Vt-1(min{t;1,x},S,r)S2.r2.0 
Vt((J,R, S) = max W(S R)+R V ( S )
(12) 
• � max t-1 (11 ,r S2.r2.0 
where the expectation in the first case is over xi S, In (12) a is 
the firm's privately known level of unit costs, R is the current 
state of sponsor-known unit costs and S is the target level of unit 
costs the firm elected (when t+l periods remained in the planning 
horizon) to reveal when t periods remain in the planning horizon 
(a i Si R), In this case r becomes the ''target'' for the next 
period (as opposed to the amount revealed in the current period), It 
is easy to see that this model can also be extended to incorporate 
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bonuses and penalties of the sort discussed by Bonin [1976] and 
Weitzman [1976] , 
d, Uncertain Renewal: The model analyzed in this paper 
focuses on the firm's incentives to under-report its research output. 
Of course situations exist in which the problem is precisely the 
opposite, That is, in many oases firms have an incentive to claim 
results which they do not have, This problem is especially acute 
when contract renewal is uncertain,16 
Contract renewal can be uncertain for two basic reasons. 
First, the level of unit costs which is satisfactory to the research 
sponsor may be vague, In other words, the length of the project 
horizon may be sensitive to the level of reported unit costs and the 
precise nature of the sensitivity may be uncertain, However, whether 
this effect causes the firm to report a higher or lower level of unit 
costs is unclear, The firm may believe that in order to get a 
contract renewal, interim reports should be exaggerated with the hope 
that later research output can justify them. On the other hand, if 
it believes the research sponsor has an underlying target in mind 
which, once reached, terminates the project, then it may further 
under-report its research output, 
The second reason why contract renewal may be uncertain is 
that there may be competition from other firms for the contracts 
awarded by the research sponsor, Several game-theoretic models of R 
and D which focus on the relationship between innovation and market 
structure have recently appeared in the literature (Loury [1979] , Lee 
and Wilde [1980] , and Reinganum [1980] ). It appears that the model 
developed in this paper can be extended to a similar game-theoretic 
setting in which firms compete for the right to do R and D, 
S , CONCLUSION 
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Section 4 has already suggested a number of extensions of the 
model developed in this paper which might be of interest to pursue, 
In this conclusion we would simply like to make a few comments on the 
literature, Most of the recent literature on dynamic incentive 
systems in planned economies has considered production of typical 
economic commodities [Murrell, 1979; Weitzman, 1980] , While costs 
might be assumed to vary from period to period, there is no 
systematic exploitation of finite resources in these models. On the 
other hand, our model is set in an environment in which the primary 
output, knowledge, is depletable, Many of the unique aspects of our 
model derive from this feature. 
There are other differences between our model and those of 
Murrell [1979] and Weitzman [1980] , For example, those authors are 
interested in the incentive effects of various ''bonus'' schemes in 
which the reward is sensitive to a current target (selected by the 
firm or the planner), while we use a ''smooth'' payoff function of a 
more neoclassical type, In spite of this, the fact that in our model 
output in one period is an argument in the next period's payoff 
function creates a link with the extant literature. 
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1. This specification of contract incentives is fairly general
it is qualitatively equivalent to a number of contractual
relationships now in use or being considered by both government
and private research sponsors, See United States Code, 
Annotated, Title 41, Public Contracts (Subpart 1-3.4, Types of
Contract, 1-3,407-2),
2, This is not a trivial assumption. One of the major problems 
with many existing government projects (e,g, the DOE Solar R and 
D program) is that firms tend to overstate the results of their 
research, See section 4 for more discussion of this issue, 
3, This approach is similar to that used in much of the recent R 
and D literature -- see Lee [1980] and the references sited 
therein for examples, One could assume that F is sensitive to a 
with aF/a a < 0 in order to capture the notion that a good draw 
from F increases the likelihood of even better draws in the 
future. It does not appear that such a modification would 
effect our qualitative conclusions, 
4. It is implicit in the form of (1) that the research sponsor 
cannot monitor the firm's research activity at all, To relax 
this assumption would integrate the present model with the 
well-known principal-agent literature, 
5. Again, this assumption precludes analysis of a class of issues 
which is clearly of interest from a practical point of view, 
24 
However, as section 4 illustrates, the methodology developed in 
this paper can easily be extended to the more general case which 
allows this assumption to be relaxed, 
6, Throughout this paper partial derivatives will often be 
indicated by subscripts, Hence Wr(r,R) = BW(r,R)/Br, 
a2W(r,R)/ar2, etc.
7, Figure 2 shows Hl(a,R) as concave, This is true for t=l but 
fails to generalize to t)l, Nevertheless, a�(R) will be well­
defined since Ht(a,R) will be positive,a 
8, The proofs of all the results in this paper follow standard 
dynamic programming techniques, Unless otherwise stated, the 
proofs are included in Appendix I, 
9. We adopt the convention that if a ai then no research is 
conducted, 
10, It is implicitly assumed in Proposition 2 that an interior 
maximum is achieved, Using (Al) and the fact that 
(i) ri(a,R) < R <=> Wr(R,R) + jl WR(a,R) ( O
(ii) ri(a,R) > a <=> Wr(a,R) + jl WR(a,a) > o 
Both (i) and (ii) hold given appropriate assumptions regarding 
the slope of W(a,R) when a = R, e.g. Wr(x,x) = - oo and
\ 
WR(x,x) = oo·for all x. These conditions also imply 
R > ri(a,R) > a for a> ai. Throughout the rest of this paper 
they are presumed to hold. 
11. See Lemma 6 below, 
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12. Furthermore, WrR = O does not mean that a solution to the
functional equation (1) fails to exist, In fact, in many oases 
it leads to an ''incentive compatible'' solution in the sense 
that r�(a,R) =a for all a� R and t L 1 (i.e, when W(r,R) is 
convex in r), While this may seem to be a more satisfactory 
outcome than an interior solution (see footnote 10) the text 
following suggests it has significant problems of its own, 
13, Of course the two assumptions are not technically equivalent, 
For example, if W(r,R) = U(R - r) where U' > 0 and U'' > 0, a 
given absolute reduction in unit costs yields the same payoff 
independent of R. This is generally not the case when WrR ) o. 
14, For example, see Murrell [1979] and the references sited 
therein. 
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15, This case also applies to the type of grant typically awarded 
academics by organizations such as the NSF, 
16, From a modeling point-of- view, over-reporting of research output 
is a tricky issue because the nature of the associated penalties 
is unclear. It appears that the only sanction typically 
available to a research sponsor is cancellation of future 
contracts, although even this is rarely observed. 
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APPENDIX I 
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the total derivative of Hl(a!,R> c, 
we have H�Ca!,R)da! =de or, rearranging, 
Similarly, 
But, from (6), 
Thus the assumption that WrR(a,R) > o implies Hk(a,R) < 0, This, in 
turn, implies da!/dR > o.
Q,E, D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: By definition ri(a,R) is given by the first 
order condition 8g2(rz •a,R)/8r = O, or 
0 (Al) 
The second-order condition, Wrr(r,R) + pd
2V1(a,r)/dR
2 < 0, is implied
by Lemma l(b). Hence ri(a,R) is a well-defined maximum. Taking the 
total derivative of (Al) with respect to R, a and c yields the 
following: 
The Proposition now follows from the assumption that WrR 0 > and
Lemma 3. 
Q. E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3; Taking the total derivative of u2(a;, R) = c 
we have da;/dc = 1/H�(a;, R) > O, Also, 
But 
But ri(x, R) < ri(a, R) since x < a, Thus llfiCaz, R) < 0 and daz/dR > O. 
Q.E. D, 
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Proof of Proposition 4: First, note that Hl(a, R) = 0 = H2(a,R) for
all a � a. Furthermore, ul(a,R) > O and H2(a, R) > 0 for all 
R La > a. Consider a i ar. For such a, 
and 
dV1 (a, r; (a , R))H�(a, R) = -� da F(a) 
Hence, 
�(a,R) > H�(a, R)-<=> �Wr(a, r;<a, R)) > -Wr(a, R)
<=> �Wr(a,r;<a,R)) < Wr(a, R) • 
Now WrR > o and r;(a, R) i R so that Wr(a, r;(a,R)) < Wr(a, R). But
0 < � < 1 and Wr < o. Thus Wr(a, r;<a,R)) < Wr(a, R) only if � is
''close to'' one, Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between H
1
and u2. 
Q. E. D. 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Proof of Lemma 4: Using a;(R), V2(a,R) can be written as 
{! g2cr;<x, R), x, R)f(x)dx
V2(a,R) = • 82( r2 (a,R) ,a , R) 
+ J g2cr;<a,R), a,R)f(x)dxa 
• 
if a > a2 
(AZ) 
Taking the derivative of (A2) with respect to R, and noting that 
ag2(rz•a, R)/ar = 0 for all a and R, we have
+ j a
and if a i a;, 
• 
Hence, if a ) a2' 
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Now WR > 0 so dV2(a,R)/dR > o. But WrR > O, drz ldR > 0 and WRR < o. 
Hence d2V2(a,R)/dR
2 is of ambiguous sign,
Q,E,D, 
Proof of Lemma 5: Differentiating (A2) with respect to a and using 
the facts that ag2(rz•a, R)/ar = 0 and 
ag2(r;, a,R)/aa = p aV1(a, r;)/aa, we have
{Y, dV1 
= 
! P �(a, r2(a, R))f(x)dx
dV1( • P � a, r2 (a,R))
From Lemma 2 , dV1(a,R)/da < O for all a and R,
Q.E. D. 
Proof of Lemma 6: Again, from (A2),
Thus WRr > O implies d
2V2(a, R)/dadR > 0, Part (b) is obvious.
Q, E, D, 
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Proof of Proposition 5: All parts of the induction are immediat.e 
from our earlier analysis except part e(iv), For all t l 2, r:(a, R) 
solves agt(r�(a, R),a, R)/ar = O. Since gt is concave (either by
assumption or from W(r,R) = U(R - r) where U' > 0 and
U'' < 0), r�+l(a, R) l r�(a,R) is implied by
agt(r�+l(a, R),a,R)/ar i 0, Now agt(r, a, R)/ar = Wr(r, R)
+ PdVt-1Ca, r)/dR, Hence
But agt +tCr�+l(a, R),a, R)/ar = 0 implies
Hence 
Wrcri+1<a,R),R) 
+ PdVt(a, ri+i<a, R))/dR = O. 
agt(r�+l (a, R), a, R)/ar = 
[
dVt-1 • P �(a,rt+l(a, R)) 
dVt • 
]- dil(a,r t+l (a ,R)) • (A3) 
Consider a) a�) a�+l' Over this range
dV't(a,p) 
dR 
for either 't = t or � = t-1, where p r�+l(a,R), Thus,
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(A4) 
But by the induction hypothesis, r�(a,R) L r�_1(a,R) for all a and R, 
Hence, because WrR ) O, it must be that
WR[r�(x,p),p ] L WR[r�_1(x,p),p] for all x <a and, in particular, for
x = a. Hence the inequality in (A4) holds, implying (A3) is 
negative, implying r�+1<a,R) L r�(a,R) for a> a�. Similar arguments
show the result holds for a i a� as well, 
Q.E.D, 
APPENDIX II 
Claim: W(r,R) = U(R-r) with U' ) 0 and U'' < 0 implies 
Proof of claim: In this case, we have WRR = U''(R-r) = Wrr and 
WrR = -U'. '(R-r) • Hence
and thus 
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1 -U''(R-r2(x,R))
2
=
a
[
U''(R-r2(x,R)) + �d2V1(x,r2(x,R))/dR
2 
+ U''(R-r2(x,R))] f(x)dx
= r 
Now 
U' '(R-ri<x,R)) [-u• '(R-ri<x,R))---------=-------- - 1] f(x)dx.
U''(R-r2(x,R)) + �d2V1(x,r2<x,R))/dR
2 
U" (R-r2 (x, R)) 
______ ___.;._ ........ _______ - 1 < 0 
U''(R-r2(x,R)) + �d2V1(x,r2<x,R))/dR
2 
since U'' < 0 and d2V1(x,r2<x,R))/dR
2 < 0, Thus W(r,R) U(R-r)
where U' ) 0 and U'' < 0 implies 
1 drz<x,R> i (WrR<rz(x,R),R) dR + WRR(ri <x,R),R)) f(x)dx < 0 ,
Similarly, it implies 
� 
dri <a,R) & (wrn<ri <a,R),R) dR + WRR<rz<a,R),R)] f(x)dx < o.
Hence it implies d2V2(a,R)/dR
2 < 0 for a > ai • For a i ai, an
analogous argument also implies d2V2(a,R)/dR
2 < 0,
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